Professor Ken Anderson's essay is 'an un abashed survey, in a short space' (at 332), which 'surfs rather than dives' (at 358), in order to allow the reader to appreciate 'just how breathtakingly broad the horizon of our rising system of international criminal law turns out to be' (at 358). The concomitant risk of this approach is to mischaracterize the analysed phe no mena by neglecting issues which fundamentally affect them. Highlight ing counterarguments and consider ing contradictory evidence, however briefly, would have been one way to canvas, albeit not capture, the complex ity of the issues and avoid excluding critical aspects of international legal developments.
The humanization and individualiza tion of international humanitarian law (IHL) lie at the heart of the rise of inter national criminal law (ICL). Anderson conspicuously fails to consider human ity as the foundational IHL principle in his argument in favour of reciprocity, the right to judge conditional on inter vention, and his claim of a trend away from intervention. This article does not comprehensively address the process or driving forces behind the humanization of international law, which have pro moted a trend towards intervention away from the historical postWestphalian pre sumption of noninterference.
Briefly, it bears noting that Anderson's depiction of passive neutrality presumes that the ICC's existence reduces the pres sure to intervene that would otherwise exist (at 334), when in fact international politics is evolving from a position of a complete lack of expectation, let alone pressure, to intervene. Veto power dynam ics responsible for the lack of intervention in Sudan today are equally to blame for past failures to intervene in situations of massive human rights abuses. The use of the veto power predates the rise of ICL, has defined the Security Council since its inception, and is likely to remain a reflec tion of the political, military and economic interests that continue to dominate inter national decisionmaking. The humani zation of international law prompted a departure from neutrality as the de facto position in international affairs towards a position of condemnation of international crimes, which is still unfortunately cou pled with passivity in action. Anderson's legitimate concern as to whether time will close this discrepancy may be answered to some extent through an analysis of the development of individual criminal responsibility in international law.
1 Section 1 of this reply describes the reasons why IHL preferences humanity over reciprocity and the unacceptable risks of relying on alternative principles to limit suffering in armed conflict. Sec tion 2 discusses neutrality as a preferred prerequisite for 'the right to judge' over being a 'just' party.
Humanity in IHL A Humanity versus Reciprocity
The principle of humanity, which recog nizes that all people have equal dignity, is the cornerstone of contemporary IHL customary and treaty law.
2 The Inter national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines humanity operationally as the endeavour to 'prevent and allevi ate human suffering wherever it may be found', with the purposes of protecting life and health, and ensuring respect for the human being.
3 In contrast, reciproc ity provides, 'the failure of one side to hold to the law releases the other side to respond in kind' (at 340). IHL was developed to address, and is still defined by, the enduring tension between reciprocity and humanity permeating all decisions regarding the conduct of hostili ties. This dichotomy has shaped, and lim ited, the effectiveness of IHL: historically, there was no method of enforcement external to the parties 4 and no incentive to comply with IHL apart from the interests of humanity. Moreover, parties to con flicts and humanitarian NGOs continue to have diametrically opposed interests in the instrumentalization of IHL.
It is immediately curious that in discuss ing the decline of reciprocity, Anderson draws on proportionality, deterrence and military necessity but does not refer to humanity as a competing rationale dic tating standards in armed conflict. His conclusion, that 'reciprocity still matters' (at 343), is made without any reference to the importance, or even the relevance, of the principle of humanity. And yet, 'humanization' has profoundly modi fied states' conduct during armed con flict. Various weapons inflicting unnec essary suffering have been prohibited by treaty and customary law, and are no longer used; the wholesale bombing of cities is no longer a routine method of attack; and members of armed forces are not killed when opportunity allows it, but instead are detained. This is not to say compliance is universal, but rather, that despite increasing capacities to inflict suffering, the employment of weaponry, tactics and strategies has nevertheless been limited, and the pool of legitimate targets also circumscribed. International criminal law has subsequently not only undermined reciprocity, but stressed its irrelevance, 'particularly in relation to obligations found within international humanitarian law which have an abso lute nonderogable character'.
5
The concern with this approach is that a 'more humane war may be one that is more likely to occur and more likely to persist once it begins', 6 whereas inhu mane conduct and weaponry may be effective deterrents to the very initiation of war because of the potential level of predicted suffering. However, as Theo dor Meron notes, there is no certainty that 'harsher laws of war would either discourage wars or shorten them '. 7 Reciprocity in practice belies equality between states, because there is no legal mechanism to check militarily advanced states' actions. Knowledge of an adver sary's less advanced military capabilities or overstretched resources would allow a stronger state to act without fear of reprisal and its armed forces members to act with impunity, leading to violations of IHL. The 'humanization' of international legal obligations has eroded the role of reciprocity in the application of inter national humanitarian law over the last century:
9 the question underlying a claim of reciprocity's efficacy is whether reciprocity may more effectively curb the extent of suffering caused by armed conflict. The three principal arguments invoked by Anderson in support of reciprocity -military necessity, influ encing nonstate actors and honouralso illustrate exactly why reciprocity is inherently problematic as a principle to limit suffering in conflict. Ibid., at 2.
B Military Necessity
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initial breach and executed only after an unsatisfied demand for reparations has been made. 12 This ratcheting down renders any reprisal susceptible to vary ing interpretations of lawfulness: retalia tion is more likely to be interpreted as a violation, which risks a reciprocal viola tion, and a downward 'spiral into unmiti gated barbarity'.
13
State military interests should not be assumed to align with the high stand ards of conduct prescribed by human ity. Recent history confirms that liberal democracies are equally capable of justi fying lowered standards and procedural safeguards to achieve military ends 14 in what has been termed the 'cancerisation of the legal system'.
15 For example, the USA torture memos demonstrate executive willingness to ignore a jus cogens norm prohibiting torture and accept unneces sary suffering in the pursuit of military advantage. Military necessity eradicates baselines and misguidedly places faith in decisionmakers who are institutionally predisposed to view adversaries' actions as unjustified -a combination condu cive to reciprocal violations and blatantly inadequate to safeguard humanity.
C Non-state Actors
The second problem with reciprocity relates to flawed assumptions in predict ing behaviour of nonstate actors likely to breach IHL, particularly in conflicts involving identity politics. Humani zation has coincided with a dramatic reduction in interstate conflict: today, the overwhelming majority of conflicts involve at least one nonstate armed group, and often several; and intrastate conflict has been the most common form of conflict since World War II.
16 Accord ingly, the more pressing contemporary challenge is securing compliance from nonstate actors not bound by the same laws nor subject to the same pressures as states. Anderson suggests that repris als on groups that consistently violate IHL 'might have had an influence upon Hamas and Hizbollah's behaviour' (at 342) as opposed to a law of war that rewards defending forces for recognizing that war crimes against their own civil ians are the best strategy against a pow erful but scrupulous enemy.
17
However, the efficacy of deterrence depends on underlying presumptions about motivations, incentives, and the likely response to reprisals, which do not necessarily apply to nonstate actors whose motivations to participate in, and experiences of, conflict differ from states. For example, the increased use by non state groups of suicide bombers, particu larly women, to target civilians reflects vastly different motives held both by the command structure, and by participat ing individuals. The very endorsement of tactics resulting in certain death reflects a cost-benefit analysis which views loss of human life as inevitable and inher ently proportionate to the ultimate goal. The dramatic increase in female suicide bombings has been variously attributed to revenge for lost family members, the hope that the sacrifice will improve the future, and protest against the loss of family and the breakdown of society as a result of conflict. Reprisals are an ineffec tive deterrent to individuals who partici pate in armed conflict and violate IHL for personal reasons not captured in a con ventional cost-benefit analysis.
Secondly, reprisals are collective sanc tions to the extent that they target a command structure better positioned to monitor and control the individ ual wrongdoer than the sanctioning agent.
19 Derek Jinks identifies two ways in which collective sanctions are likely to reduce compliance with IHL: firstly, they increase the entitativity of a group, which in turn increases individual social iden tification with the group, 20 particularly since this results in perceived victimiza tion during conflict; 21 and secondly, they increase the glorification of the ingroup, even if atrocities are committed, against members of an outgroup. 22 Jinks notes that 'some evidence suggests that this process is also strongly associated with dehumanization of the victims of in group acts'. The radical change in policy reflects an acknowledgement that violations of international standards on a reciprocal tu quoque basis cannot be justified either morally or practically.
D Honour in Armed Conflict
In preference to a contractarian view of reciprocity, Anderson supports 'recip rocal obligations of soldiers' relating to their professional role and social rela tions based on the concept of honour (at 341). Much more has been written about honour than can be discussed here, but at the very least, it is clear that honour is not a sufficient 'medium for enforcing decency on the battlefield'.
26
The sociological reality that exists in opposition to honour, and permeates even professional armed forces, is the persist ent dehumanization of adversarial forces. The atrocious abuses of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are not the result of a failed chain of command, or rogue individu als acting outside the acceptable code of conduct: they are symptoms of a 'ration alized system of violence'. 27 This phe nomenon is not recent, nor is it exclusive to the US armed forces -it is a universal trend powerfully demonstrated in social psychological experiments and also recognized by the ICRC. For example, Zimbardo's (1972) college prison experi ment was infamously aborted after students roleplaying guards exhibited such cruelty that Zimbardo feared the students roleplaying 'prisoners' would suffer mental and physical harm. The research challenged the 'bad apple' thesis, and has been invoked to explain the systemic nature of abuses inflicted by soldiers on enemy forces. 30 and willingness to obey authority is further reinforced by a military hierarchy which insti tutionally supports demonization and dehumanization of the enemy, resulting in moral disengagement. 31 The conclu sion, that 'the perception that there are legal norms is more effective than the acknowledgement of moral requirements in keeping combatants out of the spiral of violence ', 32 further undermines the claim that honour is an effective sociological code of conduct.
Psychological and sociological re search comprehensively describes the contours of these phenomena, and the inevitability of their occurrence with out legal codification and enforcement. Violence is practised across time and context by one group against another to 'dramatize the fact that the human com munity and its ties extend only to a cer tain limit, and that persons outside are alien and subordinate'. 33 Social norms are easily distorted, and a 'culture of the professional honor of soldiers, [which determines] what they are willing or not willing to do on the battlefield' 34 has an extremely limited protective capacity.
The shortcomings of honour as an effective code of conduct are most obvi ous in egregious acts which cannot be justified on any grounds -not by mili tary necessity, nor proportionality, nor deterrence -such as rape and sexual violence. Despite its longstanding sta tus as a crime under customary inter national law and IHL, 35 'in many con flicts, some soldiers, perpetrators, and world leaders viewed rape as a fringe benefit of war, an unspoken perk': 36 before 1994, honour did not prevent the systemic and widespread com mission of crimes of rape and sexual violence in armed conflict. Anderson refers to the reciprocal obligations of sol diers on the basis of honour, but surely honour should also protect those who are unable to defend themselves, and not only those who have the capacity to reciprocate with dishonourable vio lations? Yet honour comprehensively failed to address the acceptance and practice of sexual violence by members of regular armed forces in countless conflicts, either through internal mili tary proceedings or through independ ent inquiries or prosecutions.
Conversely, in many conflicts, including the genocides in Bangla desh, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 'sexual violence is seen as a crime of honor, an act against the community not the physical integrity of the individual 30 The ICRC noted there is a high rate of 'victimi zation' (being victims of violence) among armed combatants; MunozRojas and Fresard, supra note 21, at 7. 38 Paradoxically a soldier's perceived 'honour' in armed conflict may depend on the active destruction of the 'honour' vested in women of the adver sarial party.
Only after intensive NGO lobbying at the ad hoc tribunals were crimes of rape and sexual violence finally punished as international crimes. 39 Only through ICL, were accepted norms challenged and standards of conduct modified to conform to the requirements of humanity. Hon our, therefore, is an inadequate method in times of conflict of reducing suffering and ensuring respect for human dignity. This is not to say that ICL has eliminated crimes of sexual violence in armed con flict; but it has facilitated the identification of such conduct as a crime, condemned its commission, and brought about con victions and sentences for perpetrators. Modifying international standards in turn catalysed military forces to reform internal regulations and enforcement mecha nisms. While we may not yet see the uni form application of such laudable reforms, their very existence is owed to legal norms generated by international criminal law.
Reciprocity would matter more if it guaranteed deterrence, and if its assump tions about behaviour were sound. Instead, it stimulates a race to the bot tom limited only by a mistaken presumed rational appraisal of military acts and material selfinterest undertaken by both sides. Reciprocity, military necessity and honour appeal to military interests and cultures rather than interests of human ity; each is more likely to exacerbate human suffering. In contrast, through the humanization of international law humanity establishes a necessary mini mum standard, which has effectively been used to cajole and pressure gov ernments to improve military practices, albeit imperfectly.
The Value of Neutral Justice A Neutrality Explains Why the 'Right to Judge' Should Not Flow from Intervention
Anderson's claim of an 'earned right' to administer justice is contrasted with an ideal of neutrality which in this context implies restraint in actions that advan tage one side of the conflict over another. He gives preference to victor's justice over the 'moral poverty of neutrality', claiming 'it would have been morally monstrous to have entertained the idea of turning [the Nazi leadership] over to neutrals for trial '. 40 For the purposes of this discussion, criminal justice denotes the process of evaluating properly admitted evidence However, the administration of jus tice cannot be separate from justice as a concept or an outcome -to abandon justice in the process is to undermine the justness of the outcome, both empirically and normatively. The two distinct cate gories considered by Anderson are firstly a conventional armed conflict involving states' armed forces, which warrants vic tor's justice and, secondly, crimes perpe trated by a government against civilians warranting 'humanitarian interven tion', which the civilians should be enti tled to judge. Thus, the appropriate judge appears not to be the victor, so much as the wronged party.
Forcibly stopping the commission of crimes does not automatically generate the ability to fairly and accurately ascer tain individual responsibility for particu lar crimes and determine appropriate sentences. It may be selfevident that a defendant is guilty of some crime/s, but the identification of the specific crimes justifying punishment is an independent outcome shaped by the nature and the quality of the trial process. If suspension of judgment is not fully effected then the conclusion of any trial is preordained. The Tokyo and Nuremburg trials were criticized as victor's justice for precisely this reason -the trials were denuded of justice as a process and the foundational presumption of innocence. In contrast, the ICC Trial Chamber's decision to order the release of the first ICC defendant, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, reflects a funda mental shift in priorities from a 'convic tion at all costs', to procedural fairness at all costs.
42
Anderson assumes that a fair trial, both in substance and in appearance, is desired, despite the fact that he seems to conceive of justice purely as an outcome and not as a process. To this extent, there remains the question of whether the victor's justice process is capable of guaranteeing a just process. It seems likely that the more horrendous the crimes, the more outraged the commu nity is, and the harder it is to genuinely suspend judgment.
At to guarantee a fair trial. 'Victors' justice' (which in this context is more appropri ately termed 'victims' justice') does not limit this tendency to vengeance but gives it expression through proceedings designed to secure convictions and sen tences. If we are to be truly just, then we must be committed to punishing defendants only for what they are guilty for, and allow them the opportunity to prove their innocence. A 'seal of justice' that merely vindicates victors' actions through a wholesale condemnation of the vanquished party's wrongs, does not provide meaningful truth or justice.
The question is one of scale and degree of distance. International crimes are inherently systematic and on a societal scale -the entire community suffers because of the scale and egregiousness of the violations. When every member of the wronged community is likely to have been personally affected by the crimes, achieving the distance necessary to be impartial may be impossible. There is an essential and central role to be played by those who have been wronged or have proven themselves the victors, but it is not limited to the courtroom. Anderson is convinced that unless 'an army sits atop its vanquished enemy' (at 337) the enormity of the crimes left unaddressed by courts mocks justice. This is precisely the point: the courtroom will always be an inappropriate and inadequate tool to reveal the enormity of the crimes. Jus tice (meaning criminal justice) is not a process designed to produce the most comprehensive and accurate version of the wrongs committed -its purpose is to attribute responsibility to a particu lar individual for specifically articulated acts on the basis of admitted evidence. Criminal justice systems are simply illequipped to address the totality of criminal conduct encompassed in the commission of international crimes. 43 For the victims and society at large, a range of other mechanisms better elicit the truth, recognition for the wrong suf fered and prevent recurrence, including truth commissions, reparations, lustration and memorialization. Criminal justice can only ever achieve a very narrow range of goals. These goals are important, and they should be pursued in conditions that maximize the justness of the process and the likelihood of a just outcome. Trials should not, however, be perceived as the only mechanism through which the per petration of international crimes can be addressed.
B The Myth of the 'Just' Party
According to Anderson, the right to administer justice is contingent on show ing oneself to be 'not the neutral, but the just party or the party of the just party' (at 338). There are two rejoinders to this proposition: firstly, contemporary con flicts render this analysis simplistic; and secondly, a just party in one scenario nevertheless sets a precedent for those who would seek to justify selfinterested interventions on a 'just' basis for inter vention.
The Ugandan, Colombian and Libe rian situations are particularly promi nent examples where government claims of being the 'just' party vis-à-vis their protective role of citizens simply do not mirror the facts. Victims' stories testify to a pattern of violence charac
